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Billy Ferguson

Hello! I am a S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at UC Berkeley. My fields of expertise include environmental economics, industrial organization, public, and market design. In my research, I study water markets, property rights, and trade externalities.

I am on the academic job market this year (2026-2027).

I graduated with a PhD in Economics from the Stanford Graduate School of Business in 2025 and was advised by Ali Yurukoglu, Paul Milgrom, and Lanier Benkard .

I grew up in Kansas (yes, there's no place like home) and studied math in my undergrad at Stanford University.

My email is billyf@berkeley.edu

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Job Market Paper

Sharing the Gains from Trade: Water Markets and Local Economies [draft upon request]
with Zane Kashner.
Markets generate gains from reallocation but can impose losses on individuals and communities. We study whether compensation can address these distributional costs without sacrificing gains from trade. Australia's 2007 Murray-Darling Basin water-market reform provides a unique setting in which to measure both the local losses from reallocation and the productive gains available to compensate them. Exploiting differences in soil characteristics to instrument for reform-induced changes in water use, we document significant local economic spillovers from water leaving irrigated communities. We estimate that a 10% decrease in local water use leads to around a 3% decline in wages, a 7% decline in agricultural employment, and a 4% decline in population. We combine these estimates with a dynamic residential choice model to recover the distribution of community willingness-to-pay for water. The median community values irrigation at AUD $75/ML, with a 90th percentile of $167/ML. These community values are large relative to our estimated median agricultural marginal product of water of $215/ML. We use the joint distribution of private gains and community values to evaluate compensation mechanisms. With full information, private gains from trade can fully compensate selling communities while preserving 76.9% of profitable trades, rising to 92.7% when benefits to buying communities can also finance compensation. When community values are private information, these shares fall to 60.3% and 75.6%, respectively. Our results show how the heterogeneity of local losses, their relationship with reallocative benefits, and the information available to target transfers determine how well markets can share gains from trade.